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Abstract 
Here we show to what extent expected world population growth will be lower as a 
consequence of implementing the recently agreed Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The SDGs include specific quantitative targets on mortality, reproductive health 
and education for all girls by 2030, which will directly and indirectly affect future 
demographic trends. Based on a multi-dimensional model of population dynamics that 
stratifies national populations by age, sex and level of education with educational fertility 
and mortality differentials, we translate these goals into SDG population scenarios 
resulting in population sizes between 8 and 9 billion in 2100. Since these results lie 
outside the 95 percent uncertainty range given by the 2015 UN probabilistic population 
projections we complement the study through sensitivity analyses of these projections 
that suggest that those uncertainty intervals are too narrow because of uncertainty in 
baseline data, conservative assumptions on correlations, and the possibility of new 
policies influencing these trends. This analysis quantitatively illustrates the view that 
demography is not destiny and policies, particularly in female education and reproductive 
health, can greatly contribute to reducing world population growth. 
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Today, the future of world population growth looks more uncertain than a decade ago, due to a 
controversial recent stall of fertility decline in a number of African countries and a controversy 
over how low fertility will fall below replacement level, particularly in China (Basten et al. 2014). 
Probabilistic population projections try to quantify these uncertainties based on statistical 
extrapolation, expert judgement or a blend of both (Lutz et al. 1999; United Nations 2015). While 
such projections published in 2008 (Lutz, Sanderson, et al. 2008) gave a 95 percent interval for 
the global population ranging from 5.2 to 12.7 billion in the year 2100, probabilistic projections 
published by the UN Population Division in 2015 based on a different approach give a much 
narrower 95 percent interval ranging from 9.5 to 13 billion in 2100 (United Nations 2015). Another 
recent set of world population projections defined alternative global population scenarios in the 
context of the work of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and related 
Integrated Assessment models. These so-called SSPs (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways) show in 
the medium scenario a peaking of world population around 2070 at 9.4 billion, followed by a 
decline to 9 billion by the end of the century with high and low scenarios reaching 12.8 and 7.1 
billion respectively (Lutz et al. 2014; O’Neill et al. 2015). As will be discussed below, these 
differences in world population projections result from different approaches taken in terms of 
disaggregating national populations and defining assumptions for the future.  
In September 2015 the leaders of the world under the umbrella of the United Nations in 
New York subscribed to an ambitious set of global development goals, the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) which unlike earlier goals give specific targets which apply to all 
countries of the world. If actually pursued, several of these targets, particularly in the fields of 
health and female education will have strong direct and indirect effects on future population trends 
mostly working in the direction of lower population growth. In this paper, we endeavor to translate 
the most relevant of these goals into SDG population scenarios and thus quantify the likely effect 
of meeting these development goals on national population trajectories. The results show that this 
would result in world population peaking around 2060 and reaching 8-9 billion by 2100, depending 
on the specific variant of the SDG scenario (see Figure 1). This analysis quantitatively illustrates 
the view that demography is not destiny and policies, particularly in the field of female education 
and reproductive health, can greatly contribute to reducing world population growth.  
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Figure 1. Future world population growth as projected according to the three SSP scenarios, the 
range of SDG scenarios presented here and the probabilistic ranges given by the UN population 
projections 
 
The various variants of the SDG scenario specified here, while consistent with the SPP 
scenarios, all lie substantially below the lower bound of the 95 percent band given by the most 
recent probabilistic UN projections (see Figure 1). This fact evidently poses serious questions to 
the reader. For this reason, after describing the definition and calibration of the demographic SDG 
scenarios the paper will have a second section in which we perform sensitivity analyses of the UN 
population projections, using their own software, which suggest that the uncertainty range given 
by them underestimates the full uncertainty of possible future world population growth. We study 
the sensitivity with respect to possible base-line errors and correlation and show how explicit 
incorporation of heterogeneity by level of education changes the picture. Our main point, however, 
is that the UN model rests on the strong assumption of structural continuity of past trends 
extrapolated over the full 21st century which is incompatible with the aspiration of the SDGs as an 
historically unprecedented effort that will change the course of global development. 
2 Translating the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into 
corresponding population scenarios 
The SDGs as approved by the United Nations General Assembly in the presence of most heads of 
state in September 2015 contain 17 goals and 169 more specific targets. Unlike the previous 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which were set in 2000 with the target year 2015, the 
SDGs refer not only to developing countries but to all countries in the world and they also include 
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the environmental dimensions in addition to social and economic dimensions. Many of them are 
motivated by their longer term future impacts – such as the energy and climate change goals – but 
the goals themselves have a target year of 2030 in order to allow a better monitoring of the actual 
achievements of these goals. Some of the goals and associated targets are in precise numerical 
form and refer to existing indicators, others are more qualitative in nature and refer mostly to the 
direction of change.  
Population trends are not explicitly mentioned in the SDGs but several of the SDGs are 
directly or indirectly related to future demographic trends. The SDG goals related to child 
mortality, maternal mortality, causes of death and reproductive health can be more or less directly 
translated into future mortality and fertility pathways. To quantitatively assess the indirect effects 
of improvements in education on fertility and mortality we utilize recent advances in multi-
dimensional population modelling, namely the three-dimensional analysis by age, sex and level of 
education (Lutz & KC 2011). This work is based on the insight that level of education is the most 
important source of observable population heterogeneity after age and sex. Consistently, more 
educated women experience lower fertility and lower child mortality – in particular during the 
process of demographic transition – and more educated men and women exhibit higher life 
expectancies. This relationship has recently been corroborated (Lutz & KC 2011) and the case for 
functional causality from improvements in female education to declining fertility has been made 
(Lutz & Skirbekk 2014). It has been shown that even under identical sets of education-specific 
fertility trajectories, different education scenarios alone can induce variation in total world 
population size of more than one billion by mid-century (Lutz & KC 2011).  
We define special scenarios translating the SDGs into population trajectories against the 
background of a recent set of scenarios developed for and by the international climate change 
research community, the so-called Shard Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O’Neill et al. 2015). 
The “human core” of the SSPs also consists of population scenarios by age, gender and level of 
education for all countries to 2100 (Lutz et al. 2014). In the following we will refer to three of the 
five SSPs, namely SSP1 (rapid development), SSP2 (middle-of-the-road) and SSP3 (stalled 
development). While the methodology and the empirical data set of the SSPs will be used here, we 
will redefine some of the specific assumptions of future fertility, mortality and education with 
reference to the SDGs and their specific targets. As will be specified in detail in the following 
paragraphs the main underlying idea is that the SDGs will help to speed up the process of 
demographic transition that otherwise would occur more slowly. In the following translation of 
the SDGs into population trends the goals are interpreted as a one time booster to development 
between 2015 and 2030 to be followed beyond 2030 by a more regular speed of development. For 
this reason the SDG population scenarios will be lower than the middle-of-the-road SSP2 scenario 
but not as low as the fast development SSP1 scenario which assumes accelerated social 
development throughout the century. Due to path dependencies of the education expansion and the 
demographic transition, this 15-year booster will results in education, fertility and mortality levels 
lower than those of SSP2 for the rest of the century. For readers who think that the development 
booster caused by the SDGs will continue beyond 2030 for the rest of the century, the SSP1 
scenarios is a reasonable approximation although the SSPs have been defined before the SDGs 
and hence differ in some minor aspects. 
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3 Operationalizing the education targets 
SDG4 which aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long 
learning opportunities for all” consists of ten more specific targets. The most specific of these 
targets (4.1) states that “by 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality 
primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes”. This is also 
the target that can be directly translated into demographic outcomes in the context of the multi-
dimensional population projections methodology mentioned above. Other targets referring to early 
childhood development, equal access to vocational and tertiary education (without giving 
quantitative targets), skills for employment, education facilities, scholarships and teacher training 
highlight other important aspects of education that are more difficult to translate into quantitative 
models. But there are two further targets with rather specific aspects that can also be partially 
quantified, namely 4.5 (”By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal 
access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with 
disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations”) and 4.6 (“By 2030, ensure 
that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and 
numeracy”). But assuming, that 4.5 is just one specific aspect of the more general Target 4.1 which 
already includes universal high quality education of all boys and girls and that indeed by this all 
young men and women become literate and numerate, no additional assumptions need to be made.  
While universal primary education has already been part of the earlier MDGs, the addition 
of universal secondary education in the SDGs is new and much more ambitious. This is partly 
based on recent insights that for poor countries to come out of poverty universal primary education 
is not enough but it must be complemented by secondary education of broad segments of the 
population (Lutz, et al. 2008). But assuming universal secondary education by 2030 for countries 
that currently have still very low primary school enrolment this target may seem overly ambitious. 
For this reason there have been some discussions within UNESCO and elsewhere whether this 
target should be interpreted in terms of the somewhat more realistic achievement of universal lower 
secondary education or whether it actually implies universal completing of upper secondary school 
which is not even achieved in all industrialized. We account for this difference in interpretation by 
specifying an alternative SDG education scenario in which only universal lower secondary 
education is reached in 2030 (SDG2) while the two other ones are based on the literal meaning of 
the goal that universal upper secondary education is reached by 2030, scenarios SDG1 and SDG3, 
which differ in terms of their fertility assumptions. 
The scenarios of educational expansion underlying the population projections presented 
here result from a further refinement of the education model presented in Lutz et al. (2014). In 
summary, we project the share of the population ever reaching or exceeding a given attainment 
level. This is done separately by country, and gender, but with 'shrinkage' within a Bayesian 
framework (with weakly informative priors). The mean expansion trajectories are modelled as 
random walks with drift (and potential mean reversion) and independent noise at a probit-




4 Translating the health targets into future mortality trajectories 
Like many of the other goals, SDG3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all 
ages”) consists of some very specific and some rather general targets. There are specific numerical 
targets on maternal mortality and infant mortality. Less specific but still highly relevant for future 
fertility trends is Target 3.7 referring to reproductive health and family planning which will be 
discussed in the fertility section below. 
Many other of the 13 specific health targets relate to individual causes of death such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, water-borne diseases, accidents, substance abuse, chemical 
pollution and preventable non-communicable diseases in general. It goes beyond the scope of this 
paper to model in detail how these specific targets on certain causes of death would translate into 
aggregate mortality rates for all countries of the world. Instead we will refer to a major recent 
exercise involving over 100 international mortality experts identifying the different forces that will 
influence future mortality trends and translating them into alternative future mortality trajectories 
(Caselli et al. 2014; Garbero & Pamuk 2014). Of the three mortality trajectories (high, medium 
and low) that were defined for all countries the low path corresponds quite well both qualitatively 
and quantitatively to the health and mortality targets as discussed above. Since this trajectory was 
also specified in terms of education-specific mortality trends – with more educated women having 
universally lower child mortality rates and better educated adults living on average longer – the 
education scenarios discussed above will also indirectly influence the future course of national 
mortality trends. Furthermore, the effects on education-specific mortality rates of other goals, in 
particular those referring to eradication of poverty and hunger as well as to improvement of 
governance are assumed to be already captured by the very optimistic mortality assumptions used 
for this low mortality trajectory. 
5 Defining education-specific fertility trajectories 
In addition to the indirect effect of education on aggregate fertility levels the health SDG includes 
one target that is likely to affect education-specific fertility rates directly. Target 3.7 states “By 
2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family 
planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national 
strategies and programmes”. While the second part of the target is of more organisational nature, 
the first directly refers to the concept of meeting the unmet need for contraception and has the 
potential to directly affect fertility levels through rapidly increasing contraceptive use. The unmet 
need is usually defined as the proportion of currently married women who are not currently using 
contraception and say that they do not want another child in the near future. When it comes to 
estimating the number of births that would be avoided in the hypothetical case that all unmet need 
would be met it is important to further distinguish between unmet need for birth spacing and for 
limiting family size. Only the latter can be assumed to have a lasting effect on lowering fertility 
rates. 
Several authors have attempted to come up with quantitative estimates of what would be 
the effect of meeting the unmet need on national fertility levels. The most comprehensive such 
analysis is by Bradley at al. (2012) using all available Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
and applying a more precise definition than before of measuring the unmet need for limiting 
family. For the global average of all 59 DHS for developing countries they find that in the case of 
eliminating unmet need the TFR would be 20 percent lower (i.e. 3.3 instead of 4.1 children per 
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woman). They find regional differences with the hypothetical decline being the highest in absolute 
terms in East and Southern Africa (3.7 as compared to 5.0) and in relative terms in Latin America 
and Caribbean (2.0 versus 3.0). In West and Central Africa the decline would be the smallest (4.9 
versus 5.4) because desired family size is still very high in this part of Africa. Hence, loosely 
speaking these calculations only refer to the difference between desired and actual family sizes, 
while education of women also tends to result in lowering the desired family size. 
In operationalizing the SDG fertility scenario it is thus a rather straightforward assumption 
to assume that achieving “universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, 
including for family planning, information and education” will result in 20 percent lower 
education-specific fertility rates by 2030. Since these services cannot be expected to be established 
overnight this is implemented by gradually lowering fertility rates from their current levels to a 
level that is 20 percent lower than in the middle of the road scenario (SSP2) by 2030 (see Figure 
2). For the period 2015-2030 this procedure (SDG1 and SDG2) is also equivalent to the 
assumptions made for education-specific fertility under the Rapid Social Development Scenario 
(SSP1). After 2030, however, the SSP1 and the SDG1 and SDG2 scenarios start to differ in their 
fertility assumptions because under SSP1 the low fertility trajectory is assumed to continue while 
under the SDG scenario narratives there is a gradual return to the middle of the road trajectory. 
The return will not be abrupt and will only be complete once the overall TFR has reached a level 
of 1.6 (see the Appendix for more details). 
 
Figure. 2. Assumed education-specific fertility rates for Nigeria under the SSP2 scenario and the 





To further test the sensitivity of the projections to different translations of the SDGs into 
education-specific fertility rates we also made the more conservative assumption that those rates 
only decline by 10 percent by 2030 in relation to the middle of the road SSP2 scenario (as opposed 
to 20 percent in SDG1 and SDG2). The SDG3 scenario thus combines a 10 percent decline in 
education-specific fertility rates with the assumption of universal senior secondary education by 
2030. 
6 Migration and other factors 
Migration is the third factor (in addition to fertility and mortality) that directly effects future 
national population sizes. While this factor can have significant effects especially for small 
populations with high in- or out-migration it is a negligible factor for global population growth, 
where it only affects the projections through the assumption that migrants have the fertility and 
mortality rates of the country of destination. Except for stressing the need for orderly migration 
and the rule of law, the SGDs do not give any specific quantitative targets that would suggest either 
higher or lower international migration streams in the future. For this reason the migration 
assumptions of the SDG scenarios are the same as those used for the middle of the road SSP2 
Scenario, which are constant in- and out-migration rates that are gradually diminished towards the 
end of the of the projection period (Lutz et al. 2014). 
Several of the other SDGs that have not yet been discussed above – such as end of poverty 
and end of hunger as well as reduced inequalities, decent work and economic growth, affordable 
and clean energy, climate action and quality of institutions could have potential indirect effects on 
future fertility, mortality, migration and education. To study whether these factors are likely to 
have effects beyond the ones assumed in the SDG scenarios here remains a research topic for the 
future. But for our attempt to develop a first approximation of demographic scenarios that reflect 
the SDGs we assume that the specified sets of low fertility and mortality and high education 
trajectories implicitly include all the other possible indirect effects of different SDGs on those 
demographic trends.  
7 Results 
Figures 1 and 3 show the resulting population growth trajectories at the global level and for the 
case of Nigeria. Table 1 also shows numerical results by continents. More details, including 
country-specific results are given in the Appendix. As expected from the above listed assumptions 
SDG1 gives the lowest and SDG3 the highest population of the three SDG scenarios. Against the 
background of the SSP1 – SSP3 range, the SDG scenarios are towards the lower end, generally 
below the middle of the road SSP2 and above the rapid development SSP1. As compared to the 
uncertainty range given by the UN probabilistic population projections at the national level the 
SDGs tend to fall into the lower quartile of the uncertainty ranges as can be seen in Figure 4 for 
Nigeria. At the global level, however, all SDG scenarios lie far below the 95 percent range of the 
UN range. This difference between the national level and global level results in terms of the 
uncertainty ranges is mostly a consequence of the very low correlations assumed in the UN 




Figure 3. Nigeria: Resulting population size for SDG1-3 plus SSP1-3 scenarios and UN ranges 
 
The SDG scenarios as defined here result in a world population that still increases to 8.8 to 
9.1 billion by mid-century and then levels off and starts a moderate decline to between 8.2 and 9.0 
billion by 2100. This is significantly below the medium variant of the UN projections which 
reaches 9.7 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in 2100. This lower global population trajectory is 
primarily caused by the accelerated fertility declines associated with the female education and 
reproductive health goals in Africa and Western Asia. 
8 Sensitivity analysis of UN probabilistic population projections 
In 2012, the UN Population Division first published probabilistic world population projections to 
2100 based on a Bayesian model that estimated future national fertility trajectories drawing from 
the collective experience of all countries for the period 1950-2010 (United Nations 2013). These 
include crucial model assumptions about the ultimate level of fertility and an eventual increase of 
fertility in countries that reach very low levels. The 2015 revision of these projections applies a 
very similar  model with a probabilistic mortality component added and updated base-line data 
(United Nations 2015). As we will show in the following, this extrapolative model is particularly 
sensitive to small changes in the base-line data for the most recent years. This is also the reason 
why the 2015 UN assessment yields a significantly higher median global population for 2100 of 
11.21 billion as compared to 10.85 billion in the 2012 assessment. For individual countries such a 
Nigeria, the differences between the two assessments are much bigger as shown below. 
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In the following we summarize sensitivity analyses of the UN 2015 projections by relaxing 
some of its assumptions while using the very same statistical model and software that the UN uses. 
We first consider the possible effect of uncertainty in the base-line data. In many countries, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan-Africa, the information about current population size, fertility and 
mortality levels is fragmentary, with estimates often based on outdated censuses or surveys that 
may show contradictory results. Nigeria is a case in point. With respect to fertility levels, estimated 
for the period 2005-10 the UN in 2008 gave a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 5.32 which for the 
2012 assessment was corrected upwards to 6.00, which is a 13 percent correction. In the 2015 
assessment the estimate for 2005-10 was again lowered somewhat to 5.91. This minimal 
downward correction in the baseline TFR resulted in a major change of the median population size 
projected for 2100 for Nigeria from 914 million (2012 assessment) to 752 million (2015 
assessment). The Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (DHS Nigeria 2014) gives a TFR of 5.5 
for 2010-13 which, if implemented in the UN model would give a still much lower projection. For 
Kenya, the assumed/estimated TFR values for 2010-15 changed from 4.41 (2012 assessment) to 
4.44 (2015 assessment) resulting in an upward correction of the projection while the 2014 DHS 
(DHS Kenya 2015) already gives 3.9 for the same period, a difference of about 15 percent. In 
China, still the world’s largest national population, there is also considerable uncertainty 
concerning its recent TFR, with estimates ranging from 1.8 to 1.2 (Zhao & Guo 2010), an 
uncertainty of 20 percent up or down from 1.5.  
We present three different sensitivity analyses with respect to uncertainty in the base-line 
data. First, we only use the UN’s own fertility base-line data as they have been used in successive 
assessments from 2008 to 2015 and apply the identical probabilistic model as used in 2015. The 
first two panels on the left of Figure 5 present the results of this exercise showing that the two 
assessment only published seven years apart show an even qualitatively very different pattern for 
the 21st century. Based on the 2008 base-line the same model shows a median that levels off and 
starts to decline before reaching 10 billion. And this median is almost as low as the lower bound 
of the 2015 assessment. Although the 2015 assessment is clearly based on some more recent data 
which for some African data seem to imply a slowing of the fertility decline there is great 
uncertainty about the quality of this data which in our view does not justify a complete change of 
great narrative for the 21st century, from an anticipated end of world population growth to 
continued high growth.1  
To further explore this important issue, we conducted more sensitivity analyses with a 
focus on countries where base-line uncertainty is the greatest. The third and fourth panels in Figure 
5 show the results of projections in which the fertility base-line is assumed to be systematically 10 
percent higher or lower than in WPP2015 in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in 
South Asia and in China, while it remains unchanged for all other countries. The results show that 
the projection model is so sensitive to possible systematic errors in base-line fertility that the 
resulting 95 percent uncertainty intervals for the world to the end of the 21st century do not even 
overlap. While under “reduced TFR” in 2100 the upper end of the 95 percent range is 10.8 billion 
under the “increased TFR” the lower end of the range is 11.4 billion.  
1
 The projection based on the 2015 assessment with the latest observations (2010-15) dropped, to provide a data set 
of past values with the equivalent size of the 2008 assessment, follows a very similar trajectory as those shown on 
the left of Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis, global level: From left to right the panels show the following 
projections: UN2015 assessment as published by UN, UN model as applied to base line data in 
UN2008 assessment, UN model applied to 10 percent higher base line TFR in selected countries, 
10 percent lower base line TFR and UN2015 model assuming perfect correlation. 
 
One may argue, that the possibility of a systematic upward or downward bias in base-line 
TFR is rather unlikely, although it cannot be ruled out due to the same kinds of measurement 
instruments (such as DHS or related surveys) being used for virtually all African countries. For 
this reason we also tested the sensitivity to base-line errors in just one country with the base-lines 
in all other countries of the world remaining unchanged. Figure 5 shows the results for the case of 
Kenya, a country already discussed above for its contradictory information regarding recent 
fertility levels. The results show that even without assuming any systematic error across groups of 
countries the median of Kenya’s population size in 2100 in the case of reduced base-line TFR by 
10 percent is below the lower end of the 80 percent range of the projections based on increased 
base-line TFR. In sum, these calculations show the very high sensitivity to possible measurement 
errors in the most recent data points of purely extrapolative statistical models that do not take any 
country-specific substantive information about socio-economic or institutional determinants of 
fertility into account, nor expert knowledge about foreseeable changes.  
Another reason for the narrow global uncertainty interval of the UN projections that results 
in the fact that both the scenarios presented here as well as the UN’s own high and low variants lie 
far outside the 95 percent range is that their probabilistic projections assume virtually no inter-
country correlation for the rest of this century. In that case trajectories above expectation in one 
country cancel against those below expectation in another country. This also explains why for 
virtually all individual countries the different scenarios discussed here lie within the 95 percent 
ranges of the UN (see the example of Nigeria in Fig.3) while at the global level they lie far outside. 
The UN projections, however, do not assume zero correlation. They estimate empirically 
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correlations among short-term fluctuations in national time series and assume that the same pattern 
of correlation will continue throughout the 21st century. Our replications of the UN projections, 
however, show that the resulting uncertainty range is only marginally broader than in case of 
assuming no correlation. This may have to do with the fact that short-term fluctuations in fertility 
tend to have a lot of noise while longer term trends in the context of the timing of demographic 
transition may be stronger correlated. Also, in times of increasing globalization, one might expect 
an increase in correlation over time. 
 
Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis for the case of Kenya. Left panel shows UN2015 assessment results, 
middle panel shows results when assuming a 10 percent higher base line TFR only for Kenya and 
right panel shows results coming from a 10 percent lower base line TFR.  
 
Since the given software does not allow one to specify alternative levels of correlation for 
the future we could only emulate the case of assumed perfect correlation (right panel in Figure 4). 
This is also the approach taken by the UN for defining its high and low variants where it is assumed 
that in all countries of the world the TFR is .5 children higher or lower than in the medium variant. 
The probabilistic uncertainty range resulting from perfect correlation is wider by a factor of five 
as compared to the “official” probabilistic projections. It also shows, that in probabilistic terms the 
range between the UN’s high and low variants (16.6 to 7.3 billion in 2100) corresponds roughly 
to 85 percent of the range given by these projections with perfect correlation while they come to 





In the context of sustainable development, world population growth is sometimes called the 
elephant in the room. Many view it as one of the most important factors in causing environmental 
degradation as well as in making adaptation to already unavoidable environmental change more 
difficult (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990; O’Neill et al. 2001; The Royal Society 2012). At the same time 
it is widely perceived as a politically sensitive topic (Bongaarts 2016) and indeed the 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development explicitly opposed the setting of 
“demographic targets”. Fertility decisions are considered as a private matter with the role of the 
state only to assure reproductive rights and to provide reproductive health services. It is 
presumably for this reason that the new SDGs do not mention population growth or fertility 
explicitly in any of the 169 targets. Yet, many of the goals and targets deal with factors that directly 
or indirectly influence fertility levels and thus population growth. 
In this paper we tried to quantify the likely effects of some of the most relevant SDG targets 
in the areas of health and education. In doing so we build on the recent literature that has quantified 
the effects of education, in particular female education, on fertility, child mortality and life 
expectancy in general. There is increasing evidence that indeed education, particularly in countries 
in demographic transition, has a direct causal effect on lowering desired family size and 
empowering women to actually realize these lower fertility goals with availability of reproductive 
health services also helping to enhance contraceptive prevalence. Since universal primary and 
secondary education of all young women around the world is a prominent goal in its own right 
(SDG 4) and is politically unproblematic – except for a few fundamentalist groups that oppose 
girl’s education – this focus on education provides a strong and convincing policy paradigm which 
in addition to all the other beneficial consequences of education also leads to lower fertility (Lutz 
2014). 
Lowering child mortality and decreasing adult mortality from many preventable causes of 
death are also politically unproblematic policy priorities. For child mortality the SDGs give precise 
numerical targets which could be directly translated into demographic trajectories and could be 
complemented through estimates of the indirect effects of better education of survival at all ages. 
This exercise could also built on the recently developed set of SSPs which are now widely used 
among the Integrated Assessment and climate change research community and for which 
alternative projections of populations by age, sex and level of educational attainment provide the 
“human core”. These scenarios also blend the effects of education with those of income and better 
food security which are other important SDGs. While clearly more research is needed to study the 
synergies between the different SDGs (Nilsson et al. 2016) and their possible additional impacts, 
the range of population trajectories resulting from different specifications of the SDG scenarios 
presented in this paper would likely not change significantly and hence present a good first 
approximation. 
It was also noted that the population growth trajectories that would result from the 
successful implementation of the SDGs – while consistent with the SSP scenarios – will come to 
lie far outside the 95 percent uncertainty range given by the 2015 UN probabilistic population 
projections. For this reason we conducted sensitivity analyses of the UN projections using their 
own software and came to the conclusion that the uncertainty ranges as presented are likely too 
narrow for considering the full range of possible future trajectories including possible structural 
discontinuities. We presented analyses showing the great sensitivity to possible errors in base-line 
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estimates of fertility and assumptions concerning the correlation among national trends. Both 
aspects suggest the consideration of markedly wider uncertainty ranges. There are further problems 
with the statistical extrapolation model used by the UN which go beyond the scope of this paper. 
In particular, the fact that all national fertility trends are given equal weight, irrespective of  
whether they summarize the experience of just a few thousand couples or hundreds of millions of 
couples. Since, in fertility, couples and not states are the relevant units of decision making and 
many countries are highly heterogeneous with respect to reproductive behavior, one could well 
argue that couples rather than countries are the independent units of observation that should be 
given equal weight, which would greatly change the projection results. Again, this would work in 
the direction of a broader range of uncertainty.  
The world community under the leadership of the UN launched an unprecedented global 
effort to strongly accelerate global efforts in development within the framework of the SDGs. 
Many of these goals, if reached, will have important effects in lowering future fertility and 
mortality rates, particularly in the least developed countries. However ambitious they are, leaders 
of all countries and the entire UN system have committed themselves to do whatever it takes – 
which may include unconventional measures – to reach the specified targets, with progress being 
closely monitored. This new global effort is by definition and by its explicit aspiration a 
discontinuity of past trends and hence cannot be captured by statistical extrapolation of past trends. 
More importantly, the analyses presented in this paper shows that, indeed, demography is 
not destiny and policies in the field of reproductive health and female education can have very 
significant longer term impacts on global population growth. More specifically, they also illustrate 
how progress towards reaching the SDGs can result in accelerated strictly voluntary fertility 
declines that could result in a global peak population already around mid-century. These strong 
effects of the SDGs on lowering global population growth in a politically unproblematic and 
widely agreed way provides an additional rationale for vigorously pursuing the implementation of 
the SDGs.  
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11 Appendix – Materials and Methods  
In this Appendix we provide additional relevant information that could not be covered in the 
limited space available in the main body of the paper. It will be structured into three parts: (a) a 
more detailed explanation of the reasoning and methodology behind the specific translation of 
targets stated in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into demographic scenario 
assumptions for the resulting SDG population scenarios; (b) a listing of results of the SDG 
scenarios for world regions and major high fertility countries; and (c) a short technical note on 
how precisely the sensitivity analysis of the UN probabilistic projections was carried out. 
11.1 Translating the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) into corresponding 
population scenarios. 
The SDGs contain 17 goals and 169 more specific targets. Unlike the previous Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) which were set in 2000 with the target year 2015, the SDGs refer to 
all countries in the world and they also include the environmental dimensions in addition to social 
and economic dimensions. The SDGs are not binding but they are aspirational and present the 
most comprehensive expression of development goals by the international community so far. In 
the following we refer to the Goals and Targets as listed on www.gloablgoals.org.  
Many of the SDGs are directly or indirectly related to future demographic trends. In the 
following we will present a brief overview of how some of specific targets and goals can be 
assumed to influence future fertility, mortality and migration trends and, if they are successfully 
implemented, how would the resulting trends be different from what would be considered to be 
the most likely future trajectory in the absence of such additional development efforts. Of all the 
169 targets some of the health and mortality related targets associated with SDG4 are most directly 
linked to future mortality trends, in some cases – such as for infant mortality – even specific 
numerical targets for the period 2015-2030 are given. Target 4.7 on universal access to 
reproductive health services and family panning will also be relevant for future fertility trends in 
countries where this is not yet the case. SDG1 and 2 on the eradication of extreme poverty and on 
food security also will have likely direct impacts on mortality and indirect impacts on fertility. 
Furthermore, due to the strong association between female education and fertility SDG4 on 
universal primary and secondary education for all girls and boys, this is expected to have strong 
indirect effects on future fertility rates particularly in countries that are still in the early stages of 
demographic transition. This relationship has recently been corroborated (Lutz & KC 2011) and 
the case for functional causality from improvements in female education to declining fertility has 
been made (Lutz & Skirbekk 2014). Using the tools of multi-dimensional population dynamics, 
recently alternative population scenarios by age, sex and six levels of educational attainment have 
been produced for all countries to 2100 (Lutz et al. 2014). As part of this recent effort also the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) which are discussed in the main text have been produced. 
Here we will use this methodology and the associated set of calibrated base-line data by age, sex 
and level of education for all countries as the basis for defining and calculating specific SDG 
population scenarios for all countries. Since the targets of the SDGs have only been specified up 
to 2030 for an illustration of the longer term impacts of meeting the targets, plausible assumptions 
for fertility, mortality, migration, and education trends beyond 2030 will have to be developed of 
the SDG scenario beyond 2030.  
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11.1.1 Operationalizing the SDG education targets in terms of their effects on 
fertility and mortality trends 
We first discuss the education goal because it has effects on some of the other goals. SDG4 which 
aims to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning 
opportunities for all” consists of ten more specific targets. The most specific of these targets (4.1) 
states that “by 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary 
and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes”. This is also the 
target that can be directly translated into demographic outcomes in the context of the multi-
dimensional population projections methodology mentioned above. Other targets referring to early 
childhood development, equal access to vocational and tertiary education (without giving 
quantitative targets), skills for employment, education facilities, scholarships and teacher training 
highlight other important aspects of education that are more difficult to translate into qualitative 
models. But there are two further targets with rather specific aspects that can also be partially 
quantified, namely 4.5 (”By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal 
access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with 
disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations”) and 4.6 (“By 2030, ensure 
that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and 
numeracy”). But assuming, that 4.5 is just one specific aspect of the more general Target 4.1 which 
already includes universal high quality education of all boys and girls and that indeed by this all 
young men and women become literate and numerate, no additional assumptions need to be made. 
With respect to the second part of Target 4.6 we do not assume that any new massive adult 
education programs will be launched in the near future, since for the countries concerned already 
universal primary and secondary education of all girls and boys is a daunting task. 
While universal primary education has already been part of the earlier MDGs, a target that 
had been missed in a large number of African countries, the addition of universal secondary 
education in the SDGs is new and much more ambitious. There have been some discussions within 
UNESCO and elsewhere whether this should be interpreted in terms of the somewhat more 
realistic achievement of universal lower secondary education or whether it actually implies 
universal completing of upper secondary school which is not even achieved in all industrialized 
countries and might be exceedingly hard to reach for countries where today high proportions of 
children are not going to school at all. We account for this difference in interpretation by specifying 
two alternative SDG education scenarios, one in which universal lower secondary education is 
reached in 2030 (scenario SDG2) and another one in which universal upper secondary education 
is reached by 2030 (scenarios SDG1 and SDG3). Both assumptions have been calibrated for the 
following calculations. 
The scenarios of educational expansion underlying the population projections presented 
here result from a further refinement of the education model presented in Lutz et al. (2014). In 
summary, we project the share of the population ever reaching or exceeding a given attainment 
level. This is done separately by country, and gender, but with 'shrinkage' within a Bayesian 
framework (with weakly informative priors). The mean expansion trajectories are modelled as 
random walks with drift (and potential mean reversion) and independent noise at a probit-
transformed scale. The trend parameters are estimated based on reconstructed attainment histories, 
and extrapolated, subject to additional and some exogenously imposed convergence within regions 
and between females and males. SDG targets are treated as 'future observations', with a potential 
trend break in 2015. Limitations shared with all existing global projections of educational 
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development include the fact that in the absence of a detailed theoretical basis, they are forced to 
rely heavily on statistical extrapolations. For example, there is little consensus on whether 'higher 
education is the new secondary education', or is fundamentally different from lower levels of 
schooling (e.g. in terms of institutional framework, its role in the life cycle, economic returns). In 
addition, global projections can necessarily not account in a satisfactory manner for idiosyncratic 
policy changes or shocks. In addition, the specific modelling choices outlined above imply a 
number of trade-offs. Using highest school attainment as the underlying measure solves many 
problems associated with historic enrolment data by allowing the consistent reconstruction of time 
series of attainment from relatively recent cross-sectional data, but comes with challenges of its 
own. While nevertheless preferable overall, the principal disadvantage of attainment measures 
deserves mention, namely the relatively long time lag with which outcomes can be observed. Late 
attainment is common in many developing countries, so that attainment cannot safely be assumed 
to be 'final' until several years above the typical graduation age. 
The model operates on 5-year age groups and in 5-year time steps. While the starting (2015) 
and target (2030) years for the SDGs conveniently line up with this grid, typical durations and 
graduation ages for different attainment levels unfortunately do not. The target is interpreted such 
that the cohort aged 15-19 in 2030 will ultimately (not necessarily already at that age, which would 
be too early for the 15-year-olds with respect to upper secondary) universally attain secondary 
education (upper secondary for scenario SDG1, lower secondary for scenario SDG2). In order to 
ensure that most late attainment is captured, completed primary attainment is observed at age 15-
19, completed lower secondary at age 20-24, and completed upper secondary and post-secondary 
by 25-29. The latter is likely to underestimate the amount of post-secondary attainment somewhat, 
but an even higher reference age would come at the cost of an even greater time lag and less current 
observational data. 
The basic model specifies that the inverse probit of the share attaining a given education 
level or higher among the entire cohort follows a random walk with country-specific drift. In 
principle, the specification also allows for mean-reversion by partially backtracking an (estimated) 
proportion of the random shock of the previous period, but in practice no meaningful mean-
reversion of this kind was picked up from the data. This is not necessarily surprising, given that 
mean-reversion on a year-on-year basis will largely be obscured by the 5-yearly data. 
Additional complexity is layered over this basic model. Gender convergence is specified 
such that at each time step, the predicted values for both genders are shifted by parameter nu 
towards their joint average. An additional level of independent errors of small magnitude that do 
not persist in the random walk and do not enter the gender convergence is allowed in fitting the 
observed data, in order to account for exogenous errors at the level of data, rather than in the 
underlying educational process. 
The fitted empirical model is adjusted during projection in the following ways. (Level and 
gender specific) country trends linearly converge over six time steps to the regional trend. The 
strength of gender convergence (in the form of parameter nu) is linearly increased in two steps to 
reach twice the past empirical value (but capped at 50 percent). The logical inequality relations 
between the participation shares (e.g. that the share attaining secondary or higher must be less than 
the share attaining primary or higher) is enforced after estimation, since they cannot be expressed 
within the estimation model without adversely affecting computation time. Strictly speaking, 
enforcing the order should occur by conditioning, i.e. omitting altogether iterations that violate the 
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ordering. Again for computational reasons, this is approximated by capping participation at the 
higher attainment at the level of the prerequisite attainment. Projected attainment at the post-
secondary level is rescaled to remain below 90percent, based on substantive reasoning. 
In terms of prior distributions, vague priors are specified that only incorporate knowledge 
of the order-of-magnitude of various effects, as well as logical bounds. The mean-reversion effect 
theta has a Beta(1.5, 1.5) prior in the interval (0, 1). The empirical gender convergence factor nu 
is level and country specific, with prior Beta(1, 5), to ensure a value in the interval (0, 1), strongly 
skewed towards smaller values. True initial levels are given conceptually uninformative 'flat' 
priors, but restricted to the interval (-4, 4) to ensure a proper posterior. The idiosyncratic shocks at 
the probit scale, i.e. the gender, level, year, and country specific epsilons, are i.i.d. draws from a 
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard error sigma_epsilon. The additional errors stem 
from a Gaussian N(0, 0.05) distribution. The (gender, level, and country specific) drift parameters 
have Gaussian priors centred on regional means (themselves drawn from a Gaussian N(0, 1) 
distribution), with standard error sigma_trend. The hyper-priors on variance parameters 
sigma_trend and sigma_epsilon are Gaussian with mean zero and variance 0.2. 
For the target scenario, the above forward projection approach is modified. While it would 
be possible to deterministically calculate the necessary additional drift to reach a given point target 
level by 2030, doing so would be a lost opportunity to gain additional insight. Instead, SDG targets 
are treated as 'future observations'. Specifically, they enter the likelihood by specifying that the 
drift resulting in the overall upward trend is allowed to increase by whatever amount necessary 
(with an effectively flat prior) to reach the target, starting in 2015. The start of the trend break is 
adjusted by attainment level, since the cohort aged 15-19 in 2010, for example, will already 
eventually benefit from increased post-secondary participation during the period 2015-2030. 
Conversely, changes starting in 2015 were largely too late to affect the primary attainment of those 
aged 15-19 in 2020. 
The aim is a 'fuzzy' target distribution at the original scale that is practically flat over a 
couple of percentage points from 97percent to 99 percent, but drops off rapidly in either direction. 
A discontinuous cut-off below 97 percent is undesirable for computational reasons, because the 
implied zero gradient in the likelihood would fail to guide the algorithm towards the target region. 
In any case, 'meeting the target' is not a perfectly sharp concept in the policy domain either, even 
once it has been operationalised with a numeric threshold. In order to achieve the above pattern at 
the original scale, an exponentially modified Gaussian distribution (with mean corresponding to 
0.97 at the untransformed scale and sigma = 0.05, lambda = 0.5) is specified around the target at 
the transformed scale. The reason for excluding values very close to true unity at the scale of 
participation shares is that these would translate to values at the transformed scale that diverge to 
infinity, requiring an unbounded speed-up of expansion. 
Note that this specification of the target scenarios means the target of 97 percent is typically 
exceeded, not just barely met, in contrast to a typical 'target-achieving path' interpolated 
deterministically. This behaviour is desired and deliberate. Intuitively, assuming a country did 
meet the targets, these trajectories represent typical paths of having got there. Retrospectively, the 
set of countries that meet the targets will have exceeded them on average, given their lack of 
perfectly exact control over the outcome. An analogy will clarify this: if we invite a group of 
runners to attempt to run 100 m in 11 s, then the successful group will clearly have taken less than 
11 s on average. Since in addition, the target scenarios have the same probabilistic nature as the 
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trend scenario, they allow for arbitrary conditioning. Examples of such conditional perspectives 
include questions related to the probability of different countries meeting fixed targets by a certain 
time, to complement the more conventional question of the probability of exceeding certain 
participation levels in a fixed year. While this is fully analysed elsewhere, for present purposes we 
focus on the 'minimal' target path traced out by the cross-sectional 0.01 quantile of the target paths 
that only just reaches the SDG target. In addition to sharing their probabilistic nature, just like the 
trend scenario, the target scenarios incorporate the nonlinearity of educational expansion as it 
really occurs. In particular, this includes the likely deceleration of expansion as universal 
participation is approached, as well as the fact that countries that meet the targets will necessarily 
have 'overshot', on average. This allows us to quantify the risk of failure associated with attempting 
to monitor whether countries are 'on track' according to simple linear plans. 
In addition, the target scenarios make explicit that accelerating expansion at one level of 
the education system will not leave other levels unaffected. In particular, some degree of 'spill-
over' to the levels above is to be expected. This effect is modelled by exposing the attainment level 
above the target level, and the level above that (if any), to an increase in trend drift that is 50 
percent respectively 10 percent as large as required at the target level to meet the target. This can 
be interpreted as an approximation to cutting the log-odds of transitioning from secondary to post-
secondary in half, and maintaining those new odds into the future. If the model were specified in 
terms of a logit curve instead of a probit curve, this interpretation would be exact. Parenthetically, 
the reason why the model is in fact specified in terms of probits is because this extends more 
naturally to model elaborations where an underlying Gaussian latent propensity for education is 
assumed at the individual level. 
The amount of 50 percent spill-over was chosen for substantive reasons: there is no reason 
to expect a targeted boost at one level would actually increase growth at the level above more than 
the target level itself (suggesting the spill-over should remain below 100percent), but it seems 
plausible to expect some upward pressure on post-secondary participation if the pool of eligible 
upper secondary graduates increases. The reason the spill-over is not specified proportionally to 
the transition rate from secondary to post-secondary is that doing so would cap a country's long-
term participation in post-secondary at the level of the current transition rate, which will often be 
unreasonably low. If the current transition rate from secondary to post-secondary is 30 percent, for 
example, and this were held constant, then universal upper secondary attainment would imply 
merely 30 percent participation at post-secondary, and no further growth or convergence with other 
countries. 
The above model was implemented in the 'Stan' software package and posteriors samples 
generated through MCMC sampling. Chains converge consistently in around 100 iterations, and a 
total of 500 samples was kept from four chains after discarding burn-in and checking Gelman's 'R 
hat' split-chain convergence criterion. The number of posterior samples is constrained not only by 
computation time, but also by the large number of scenario-time-country-level-gender-specific 
parameters. For each scenario, storage of the results requires more than 5 MB per iteration. 
However, even 500 samples in fact results in projection quantiles that are sufficiently smooth (as 
evident in Figure S1). 
In addition to the main SDG1 scenario that interpret the SDG education target in terms of 
referring to universal completion of upper secondary education, an alternative SDG2 scenario 
makes the weaker (and possibly more realistic) assumption that by 2030 universal completion of 
25 
 
lower secondary education is achieved. These two different education scenarios will then be 
combined with two different fertility scenarios as described below. 
 
Figure S1. Examples of India and Nigeria for educational attainment trends of cohorts aged 15-19 
in the stated year: empirical (+), trend extrapolation (---) and target scenario SDG1 (-.-.-.-)
 
 
11.1.2 Translating the health targets into future mortality trajectories 
SDG3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages”) consists of some very 
specific and some rather general targets. Target 3.1 for instance states precisely: “By 2030, reduce 
the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births”. Global estimates show 
that maternal mortality rates fell by about 44 percent over 25 years from 385/100.000 in 1990 to 
216 in 2015 (UNFPA et al. 2012). The target thus implies a massive acceleration in the decline 
over the coming 15 years, but since this is only a minuscule part of total global mortality, this 
specific target will hardly affect overall demographic trends.  
Health Target 3.2 relates to child mortality and is much more relevant for future population 
growth since the prematurely dying children would also have been potential future parents. The 
target states precisely that all countries should reduce under-5 mortality to at least as low as 25 per 
1000 live births. Given that this indicator over the past 15 years has declined from 166/1000 to 
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currently 99/1000 in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN estimates for 1995-2000 and 2010-15), a substantial 
acceleration of the decline will be required. The medium UN projections (2015) only expect it to 
decline to 68/100 by 2020-25. 
Target 3.7 referring to reproductive health and family planning will be discussed under the 
fertility implications below. 
Several of the 13 specific health targets relate to individual causes of death such as 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, water-borne diseases, accidents, substance abuse, chemical 
pollution and preventable non-communicable diseases in general. It goes beyond the scope of this 
paper to model in detail how these specific targets on certain causes of death would translate into 
aggregate mortality rates for all countries of the world. Instead we will refer to a major recent 
exercise involving over 100 international mortality experts identifying the different forces that will 
influence future mortality trends and translating them into alternative future mortality trajectories 
(Caselli et al. 2014; Garbero & Pamuk 2014). Of the three mortality trajectories (high, medium 
and low) that were defined for all countries the low path corresponds quite well both qualitatively 
and quantitatively to the health and mortality targets as discussed above. Since this trajectory was 
also specified in terms of education-specific mortality trends – with more educated women having 
universally lower child mortality rates and better educated adults living on average longer – the 
education scenarios discussed above will also indirectly influence the future course of national 
mortality trends. Furthermore, the effects on education-specific mortality rates of other goals, in 
particular those referring to eradication of poverty and hunger as well as to improvement of 
governance are assumed to be already captured by the very optimistic mortality assumptions used 
for this low mortality trajectory. 
11.1.3 Defining education-specific fertility trajectories 
The health SDG also includes one target that is likely to affect education-specific fertility rates 
directly. Target 3.7 states “By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-
care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of 
reproductive health into national strategies and programmes”. While the part of the target is of 
more organisational nature the first directly refers to the concept of meeting the unmet need for 
contraception and has the potential to directly affect fertility levels through rapidly increasing 
contraceptive use. The unmet need is usually defined as the proportion of currently married women 
who are not currently using contraception and say that they do not want another child in the near 
future. When it comes to estimating the number of births that would be avoided in the hypothetical 
case that all unmet need would be met it is important to further distinguish between unmet need 
for birth spacing and for limiting family size. Only the latter can be assumed to have a lasting 
effect on fertility rates. 
Various studies have attempted to come up with quantitative estimates of what would be 
the effect of meeting the unmet need on national fertility levels. The most comprehensive such 
analysis is by Bradley at al. (2012) using all available Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
and applying a more precise definition than before of measuring the unmet need for limiting 
family. For the global average of all 59 DHS for developing countries they find that in the case of 
eliminating unmet need the TFR would be 20 percent lower (i.e. 3.3 instead of 4.1 children per 
woman). They find regional differences with the hypothetical decline being the highest in absolute 
terms in East and Southern Africa (3.7 as compared to 5.0) and in relative terms in Latin America 
and Caribbean (2.0 versus 3.0). In West and Central Africa the decline would be the smallest (4.9 
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versus 5.4) because desired family size is still very high in this part of Africa. Hence, loosely 
speaking these calculations only refer to the difference between desired and actual family sizes, 
while education of women also tends to result in lowering the desired family size. 
When operationalizing the SDG fertility scenario it is thus a rather straightforward 
assumption to assume that achieving “universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care 
services, including for family planning, information and education” will result in 20 percent lower 
education-specific fertility rates by 2030. Since these services cannot be expected to be established 
overnight this is implemented by gradually lowering fertility rates from their current levels to a 
level that is 20 percent lower than in the middle of the road scenario (SSP2) by 2030. For the 
period 2015-2030 this procedure is also equivalent to the assumptions made for education-specific 
fertility under the Rapid Social Development Scenario (SSP1). After 2030, however, the SSP1 and 
SDG scenarios start to differ because under SSP1 the low fertility trajectory is assumed to continue 
while under the SDG scenario narrative there is a gradual return to the middle of the road trajectory. 
The return will not be abrupt and will only be complete once the overall TFR has reached a level 
of 1.6. 
While the SDG1 and SDG2 scenarios assume 20 percent lower education-specific fertility 
rates in all countries that in 2005-10 have a TFR of 2.5 or higher, this might be an overestimation 
of the effect due to possible interactions with education: More educated women find it easier to 
get access to overcome the obstacles to meeting the unmet need. For this reason we also calculated 
an alternative scenario with only 10 percent fertility reduction (SDG3)(Lutz 2014). 
What this implies exactly in terms of assumed future trends in education-specific TFRs and 
population level TFRs is illustrated in Figure 2 (in the main text) for the case of Nigeria. While 
SDG1 and SDG2 refer to the two different education scenarios as described above combined with 
20 percent declines until 2030 in education-specific fertility levels, SDG3 combine the lower 
secondary completion with only 10 percent declines in education-specific fertility levels. 
11.1.4 Migration and other factors 
Among the components of population change migration is the third factor (in addition to fertility 
and mortality) that directly effects future national population size. While this factor can have 
significant effects especially for small populations with high in- or out-migration it is a negligible 
factor for global population growth. Since (at last for the time being) there is no migration leaving 
our planet the only minor difference that can arise in global projections is due to the fact that in-
migrants are assumed to be exposed to the fertility and mortality levels of their new home 
countries, which can be quite different from those of the countries of origin. Except for stressing 
the need for orderly migration and the rule of law the SGDs do not give any specific quantitative 
targets that would suggest either higher or lower international migration streams in the future. For 
this reason the migration assumptions of the SDG scenarios are the same as those used for the 
middle of the road SSP2 Scenario. 
Important other SDGs that have not yet been discussed above – such as those on reduced 
inequalities, decent work and economic growth, affordable and clean energy, climate action and 
quality of institutions could have potential indirect effects on future fertility, mortality, migration 
and education. This should be a research topic for the future. But for our attempt to develop a first 
approximation of demographic scenarios that reflect the SDGs we assume that the specified sets 
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of low fertility and mortality and high education trajectories implicitly include all the other 
possible indirect effects of different SDGs on those demographic trends.  
11.2 Results 
Figure 1 (in the main text) shows the global level results for population size until 2100 of the 
different scenarios together with the global uncertainty range given by the UN projections. It shows 
that all SDG scenarios as well as SSP1 and SSP2 peak during the second half of the century.  Only 
SSP3 which is based on the narrative of a stalled fertility decline shows continued population 
growth throughout the century. 
Table A1 lists numerical results for the three SDG scenarios defined here, for the three SSP 
scenarios given in the literature (7) as well as the upper and lower bounds of the 95 percent 
uncertainty interval given by the UN2015 probabilistic projections. 
It is worth noting that the SDG and SSP scenarios are based on somewhat different country 
groupings that explain some of the differences in addition to the main difference explained in the 
main text, namely that the SDGs are viewed here as a turbo booster of development that is only 
turned on for the period 2015-2030. This results in the fact that the SSP1 scenario (called 
Sustainability) has a clearly lower total world population than the SDG scenarios. Another reason 
is that non-OECD countries with TFR < 3.0 in 2005-10 were under the SSP1 narrative assigned a 
‘low’ fertility scenario, whereas under the SDG scenarios only the fertility in countries with a TFR 
above 2.5 was assumed to be affected and therefore were assigned ‘medium’ fertility in the future. 
Some of the larger non-OECD countries, with TFR<2.5 affected by this difference in assumptions 
are Indonesia, Bangladesh, China and Russia.  
11.3 Technical note of the sensitivity analysis of the 2015 probabilistic UN 
projections 
In order to analyse the sensitivity of probabilistic model of Alkema et al. (2011) and Raftery et al. 
(2013) that provided the basis for the 2015 UN Assessment of World Population Prospects (WPP) 
four sets of projections were carried out. In each projection we used the “bayesTFR” package in 
R, described in Ševčíková et al. (2011), to estimate parameters in Bayesian hierarchical model and 
generate future Total Fertility Rate (TFR) values for all countries and the “bayesPop” package to 
produce probabilistic population projections. Each projected population was based on the same 
simulated future life expectancy distributions and fixed medium migration scenario, provided as a 
default within the “bayesPop” package.  
In the first projection, the future fertility rates were generated using TFR data from the 
2015 version of the WPP. These were then passed to the population projection, to serve as a 
baseline predictive distribution, to compare other projections against. This replication of UN 
projections based on the available software packages is marginally different from the official UN 
probabilistic population projections as the bayesTFR and bayesPop R packages 1) implements an 
alternative method for the projection of mortality age patterns in some countries and 2) excludes 
data and projections for some very small countries for which it is not clear how the UN projections 
deal with them. As a result the global median in 2100 is slightly higher (11.29 billion compared to 
11.21 billion) and the uncertainty range is somewhat more narrow, for example the 80 percent 
prediction interval shrinks from 10.04-12.50 billion to 10.21-12.45 billion. The estimation of the 
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fertility decline model parameters, forecasts and population projection were completed in 
approximately 6 hours on a standard desktop 64-bit PC with 16GB RAM, 3.60GHz processor. 
 




Table S1. Population projections for the world and six continents, various sources 
 
Year SDG – 2016 SSPs - 2014 UN - WPP 2015 







Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
World 
2010 6,871  6,871  6,871  6,871  6,871  6,871   
 
2030 8,112  8,152  8,200  8,024  8,256  8,511  8,360  8,648  
2050 8,759  8,866  8,964  8,504  9,140  9,966  9,284  10,182  
2100 8,192  8,434  8,654  7,084  8,948  12,752  9,494  13,294  
AFRICA 
2010 1,022  1,022  1,022  1,022  1,022  1,022   
 
2030 1,448  1,468  1,488  1,458  1,526  1,610  1,646  1,712  
2050 1,760  1,816  1,874  1,800  2,017  2,323  2,324  2,627  
2100 1,968  2,093  2,255  1,924  2,620  3,922  3,442  5,589  
ASIA 
2010 4,141  4,141  4,141  4,141  4,141  4,141   
 
2030 4,752  4,769  4,797  4,680  4,828  5,019  4,805  5,044  
2050 4,946  4,987  5,031  4,727  5,107  5,682  4,928  5,634  
2100 4,135  4,220  4,294  3,320  4,355  6,858  3,843  6,317  
LATIN 
AMERICA AND 
2010 590  590  590  590  590  590   
 
2030 695  698  698  678  702  738  702  739  
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 Year SDG – 2016 SSPs - 2014 UN - WPP 2015 







Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
THE 
CARIBBEAN 
2050 746  756  752  696  758  865  728  838  
2100 682  709  693  520  684  1,094  558  902  
Burkina Faso 
2010 16  16  16  16  16  16   
 
2030 25  25  26  26  27  29  25  29  
2050 31  31  33  33  38  46  33  51  
2100 35  36  40  37  53  81  35  160  
Cameroon 
2010 20  20  20  20  20  20   
 
2030 26  26  27  26  27  29  31  35  
2050 30  31  32  31  33  37  40  57  
2100 31  32  34  29  36  49  44  145  
Chad 
2010 11  11  11  11  11  11   
 
2030 17  17  17  17  18  19  20  23  
2050 20  21  22  22  25  28  27  43  
2100 22  24  25  25  33  44  29  144  




 Year SDG – 2016 SSPs - 2014 UN - WPP 2015 







Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
2030 103  103  106  103  107  112  111  123  
2050 116  116  122  115  126  142  130  174  
2100 114  114  126  100  134  202  120  345  
Ethiopia 
2010 83  83  83  83  83  83   
 
2030 115  118  118  119  124  131  128  148  
2050 136  141  141  143  159  183  153  228  
2100 147  155  155  142  190  284  124  445  
Ghana 
2010 24  24  24  24  24  24   
 
2030 34  35  35  34  36  38  35  39  
2050 40  42  43  41  47  55  43  58  
2100 43  46  47  41  58  91  40  128  
India 
2010 1,225  1,225  1,225  1,225  1,225  1,225   
 
2030 1,461  1,468  1,489  1,457  1,521  1,608  1,448  1,605  
2050 1,586  1,596  1,633  1,543  1,715  1,982  1,472  1,978  
2100 1,378  1,390  1,460  1,131  1,569  2,687  954  2,739  
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Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
Iraq 
2010 32  32  32  32  32  32   
 
2030 47  47  48  47  50  55  51  57  
2050 58  59  62  59  68  85  71  97  
2100 66  67  74  62  89  169  88  284  
Kenya 
2010 41  41  41  41  41  41   
 
2030 59  60  61  59  61  66  62  69  
2050 72  75  78  73  80  95  81  111  
2100 80  86  93  75  98  157  87  268  
Madagascar 
2010 21  21  21  21  21  21   
 
2030 30  31  31  31  33  35  34  38  
2050 36  37  38  38  45  52  46  65  
2100 40  41  43  38  59  89  56  187  
Malawi 
2010 15  15  15  15  15  15   
 
2030 24  25  25  25  26  28  25  28  
2050 32  35  34  35  41  48  35  51  
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Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
2100 39  46  46  46  68  109  43  159  
Mali 
2010 15  15  15  15  15  15   
 
2030 24  24  25  24  26  27  25  29  
2050 29  30  32  31  36  42  34  56  
2100 34  35  38  35  48  66  38  201  
Mozambique 
2010 23  23  23  23  23  23   
 
2030 32  32  33  32  34  35  39  44  
2050 37  38  39  39  42  47  52  78  
2100 39  41  43  38  50  68  59  240  
Nepal 
2010 30  30  30  30  30  30   
 
2030 39  40  40  40  42  45  31  35  
2050 46  46  48  45  51  62  30  42  
2100 46  47  49  40  55  102  14  49  
Niger 
2010 16  16  16  16  16  16   
 
2030 26  27  27  27  30  33  33  38  
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Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
2050 35  37  38  41  51  63  54  90  
2100 43  48  52  57  98  161  78  524  
Nigeria 
2010 158  158  158  158  158  158   
 
2030 244  247  253  243  253  268  247  277  
2050 332  344  363  333  371  435  313  478  
2100 439  478  549  439  576  879  326  1,494  
Pakistan 
2010 174  174  174  174  174  174   
 
2030 224  225  229  224  237  255  232  258  
2050 248  251  261  249  286  344  265  359  
2100 235  241  260  212  314  551  209  629  
Philippines 
2010 93  93  93  93  93  93   
 
2030 117  118  120  117  122  131  117  130  
2050 129  129  136  127  141  170  127  172  
2100 123  124  137  107  147  251  95  295  




 Year SDG – 2016 SSPs - 2014 UN - WPP 2015 







Fertility Scenario^ -20% -20% -10% -20%  +20% 
Education Scenario Secondary Completion by 2030    
Upper  Lower Lower    
2030 18  18  18  18  19  21  22  24  
2050 20  21  21  21  25  32  31  42  
2100 21  23  23  20  33  60  41  127  
Uganda 
2010 33  33  33  33  33  33   
 
2030 55  56  56  56  60  65  57  66  
2050 73  76  79  79  93  113  79  123  




2010 45  45  45  45  45  45          
2030 67  68  69  69  73  78  78  87  
2050 81  84  86  88  102  120  112  162  
2100 92  96  102  98  141  212  147  546  
Notes: ^ Fertility Scenario: 20% lower than SSP2 for SDG1 and SDG2, and 10% lower for SDG3. SSP3 has 20% higher than SSP2 and SSP1 
has 20% lower. 
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